Ill this paper, we present the theoretica.1 foun(la.tions which underlie our current research. We emphasize a methodologicaJ point: connections among proposed theories of discourse structure must be carefiflly explicated. By making these connections, we ca.n (letermilm whether theories ma.ke equiva.lent claims, consistent 1)ut unrelated cla.ims or differ iu substa.ntive issues. A synthesis of current theories is required, a descriptive fl'a.mework which assumes the common ground and which highlights issues to be resolved. Further, there a.re two distinct :lh.ctors to guide us ill developing such a synthesis. First, the descriptive fl'a.mework nmst facilita.te the fi:)rmula.tion of controversi;d issues in terms of empirical predictions. Then, the synthesis ca.n I)e developed a.nd refined by linguistic studies. Second, the fr~uuework must be a.pplicaJ)le to computer processing of na.tural language, both understa.nding and gener~tion. Our particula.r interest is the computer generation of explanations in a. tutoring system. Idea.lly, the fi'a.mework will provide a. me~ns through which the results of discourse a.nalysis and computatiorml linguistics ca.n inform one another.
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In its broadest outline, the goaJ is to uu(lersta.ad the precise i~H:era.ction between fea.tures of tbrm, meaning a.nd ffim(:tion ill the crea.tioll of discourse coherem:e. Wha.t kiuld o1' tbrm, mea.ning ~tnt(i flmction links occur ])etween uttera.Jlces a.nd how a.re these thre~, ki,l(Is of links recognized? In a tirst step towards the synthesis we wouhl like to see, we will discuss the l~erspective which the G&S (Grosz and Sidner 1986) and RST (=RhetoricaJ Structure Theory, Ma.nn and Thompson 1988) theories take on links of meaning a.nd function. We conclude with a brief description of a.n empiricaJ study suggested by this theory compa.rison. Note tha.t we consider only monologic discourse at this time, believing genera.lizz~tions between this a.nd multi-agent discourse to be prema.ture.
In the study and discussion of rhetorica.l relations, the terminology ha.s become nonsta,ndard a.nd confusing. Here, we a.dol)t the term "discourse rela.tions" to mea.n all the conn(,ctions a.mong the exl)ressions ill (liscourse which, ta.keu tog(,th(~r, a.ccount 1or its ('()]lerence. So, in order to be a. (liscourse relation in the sense used here, two criteri,~ a.re requir(,(I. One, the rebttion concerns elements of a sentence utterance a.nd other utteraJtces in the context. Two, the rel;Ltion must be recognized in order to understand the discourse, i.e., it contril)utes to coherence ra.ther than another concern such as style. As suggested above, SOlne fea.ture of form, mea.ning or fimction defines a discourse relation. These will be termed textual, informa.tiona.1 a.nd intentionaJ discourse relations respectively. Informational a.nd intentional discourse rela.tions a.re essentia.lly non-linguistic in the sense that they do not originate with la.nguage. Mffch recent work on discourse relations either explicitly discusses or implictly uses a. distinction between in|brma.tionaJ and intentiona.1 relatious (Schiffrin 1987 , Redeker 1990 , Hovy and Ma.ier 1992, Moore a.nd Polla.ck 1992, Moser 1992, Sanders, Spooren and Noor(hnan 1992, inter aJia.). The distinction, a. kind of sema.ntic-l)ragmatic distinction, concerns the source of discourse rela,tions, whether ,~ rela.tion orgina,tes with what is being talked about (informationa.1) or with why we a.re taJking about it (intentionaJ). Inibrma.tionzd discourse relations arise bec,~use the meanings of exl~ressions in utt(.~ra.n('(-,s, the things 1)eing ta.lked about, stand in some relation ill tlle domain of discourse. CAUSE, ['or exa.mple, is a.n iuforma.tiona.l rela.tion because it is a rela.tion between things tha.t a,r~, being ta.lked a.l)oul., tim fa('l, of on(~ situa,tion or ew:nt causing another. Intentional relations, ill coiltrast, concern how one spa ll is intellded t() affect the bearer's mental attitude about another, i.e., why the speaker included some span of text. For example, the EVIDENCE relation holds between two text spans if one is int(~ll(led to increase the heater's belief in the other.
GaS take a spea.ker's plan to be the source of discourse structur(~. A general intention may dominate several subintentions which may theutselves be fiH'ther ,'~,lil,~,(I. At the bottom of the hierarchicM structure are intentions which are rea,lize(I by 1)roduci,,g iltter;,.llC(~S ill the discourse,. Intentions higher in the intention structure are realized by the subintentions they dominate and, possibly, additional utterances which express the higher level intention. Intentions are related I)y dominance, when one intention generates one or more sul)intentions, or by satisfa.ction-preceden(:e, when the realization of one intention is a. precondition ior the realization of a.llother, hi this theory, spans of text are related indirectly by the relatiolls I)etweell the intc~lll.iolls they rea.lize.
In the original formulation of RST, the inibrmational-intentional (listillction wa.s noted (th(,re called "subject matter" and "l)resenta.tiona.1 '' relations), but wa.s not fully a,l)precia.ted. Text is hierarchically structured and exa.ctly one R.ST relation is postulated 1)etwe('ll contiguous spans. Moore and Pollack (1992) 1)ropose that, iH th.ct, two contiguous spans of text may be ill both an informational and an intentional relation simultaneously and that recognition of one kind of relation can facilitate recognition of the other. They note that inteHtiona.1 relations arise because "consecutive discourse elements are rela,te(I to one a.~lother 1)y mea.~s (~[' tlm ways in which they participate ill [a spea.ker's] plan." (1). 2). A~ i~tentioHal rela.tiol~ i~(lic:~.tes I)()th ~, direction of elrect and a kind of effect. Both elements ()f' a.n intention~d rela,tioll iJl R ST c(~rt'esl~Oll(I 1,o elements in th(, relations among intentions in G&,S.
First of all, one span is contributed with the intention of affecting the purpose of another span. In the original RST with only a single relation between Sl)ans, the direction of the rela.ti,~n (from satellite to nucleus) always represented the direct|oH of efiect, h, i l,troducing simultaneous intentional and informationa.1 relations, nucle;:l.rity is an a.spect of intenti(:)md rela.tiolls only. The direction of an intentional relation ill I(.ST corresl~onds to dominance ill G£;S. Tha.t is, the satellite span, S, affects ttle 1)urpose of tlle nuclells sinful, N, ollly if the intenti()ll that: S re~l.lizes in (lonlim~.ted by the intention that S and N (and possibly others) realize together.
Second of all, in RST, one span is intended to a.fi'(:(:t another in ol~e of sevel'al ways. For exa.mp]e, a satellite span, S, may be intended to ;~.fli~ct a he~.rel"s I)elief in the ml(:le~s spa.n, N, (the EVIDENCE relation); or S may be intended to a.trect a. bearer's desire to perform th(, ~.(:tiou i~t(lical.ed by N (the MOTIVATION relation). (.',orr(~sl~on<lihg]y ill (;X:S, intelltio~s ol" w~.~'i~)~ts kinds m~l.y domim~.l,e other intentions. Roughly sl)ea.kihg , intentio:ts re,dAzed 1)y sl~ea.kin~ ~.r(~ I o (,ithe~" a.lrect a he;~.rer's beliefs or her actions. All RST EVII)ENC. E relatio~ c;~,n occur onlywhe~ th(, d(~mina,ting intentio~ is to affect another's belief. Similarly, a.n R ST MOTIVATION rela.tion ('a.n occur only when the dominating intention is to affect a.nother's a.ctio~. Thus the different kinds of intentional efl~ects in RST correspond to different kinds of dominating intentions ill G~S. However, RST makes more distinctions among kinds of effects thal~ G(~S, e.g., 1)oth EVIDENCE and .IUSTIFICATION are ways of affecting beliefs and both MOTIVATION and ENABLEMENT are ways of a.ffecting actions. Now we turn to the status of intbrmational relations in the two the(~ri(:s, h~ R.ST, a singh' informational relation is assigned 1)etween sl)ans of text. As a result, RST iHformational rela.ti(ms concern the sorts of entities denoted ])y entire spa~s, such as situ;~.l,it~ns and events. If we ad(~pt the view of Moore and Pollack, recognizing that inlbrmationa.1 ~l.tl(I intentional relati(~ns occur simultaneously, the informational relations are silH1)lified. As noted a.bove, m~clearity, which was an element of tile unique RST relation between spans N and S, is now a.n element of the intentiol~a/ relation and is independent of the intbrm~.tional rela.tion. Tha.t is, informatiom~.l relations no long~r conflate the sem~tntic link between situa.tio~s eXl)r(~sse(I I~y two sl)a.~s ;~n(I the domin~Lnce of Sl)~a.k~r intentions realized by those spans. In fact, without this conflation, it is unclear whether the semantic relations hetween situations and events is in principle diffe.reut fl'om semantic links hetween other kinds of entities. Is the informational relation between two spans of text necessarily a relation hetween the entire spans? Or, is it l~ossibh, that the infornmtiolml relation is a series of links between wl.rious expressions contairmd in th(, Slm.lls? Examl~les of 1.1,,se links I~etween smaller constituents are would are coreference anl(I ;i. ca.usal link I)etw(,(~J~ (,×l~r¢,ssi¢~Jls such as "l'Ul~ a red light" and "the ticket." G&,S stresses that intentions of the speaker ar¢~ the primary sour((, of (lis~'ours(~ structure. Domain knowledge plays a role in recognizing the intentional structure, but it is (Ioubtful whether any special distinction wouhl be made betweezl khowle(Ige about events a.tkd sit.u~l.tions arid knowledge about other kinds of domain entities.
In comparing the status of intentional a.lld intbrmation~d discourse rela.tiozLs in I)oth RST and G,~,S, at least two issues were specified whose resolution in currently pl'esume(l by I)oth theories in isolation. First, what types of clominalw.e are distillguished by the theory-just dominance, dominance hy beliet:affecting intention versus dcuHina.uce by actiou-alli~ctittg intention, or the full range of RST intentional relations? Second, do semantic links between whole spans of text play a role in the theory, or do semantic relations between all sorts of eud.ities have the same status? Both these questions can be answered sel)ar,a.tely del)ending on whether they are meant as a question ahont linguistic theory or ahout its al~l)lication to language processing. Space prechtdes a discussion of textual discourse relations as well as questions about how the three kinds of relations interact. Further, proposals from linguists (Schiffriu 1987; R.e(leker I992) must be integrated into the synthesis.
We conchtde by sketching a discourse analysis study which begins to address the first question cited above, one which we plan to do. Using a broad range of text types, we select as tokens the pairs of spans that are related by lexical markers of discourse relatioHs such as "so," "hecause" and "therefore." For each token, we code the intbrmatioiml a.nd inteHti(:mal re];i.tions that co-occur with it. As emphasized by Moore and Paris (1992) , there is not a, one-to-olLe nlapl)illg between intentional and informational relations. Though not COml)letely indel)en(lent, the i~ossibilities to1" intbrmational relations given the occurrence of a particul~.r intentional relatioxD ~l.t'e manhy, and vi('e versa. By investigating the range of combinations of informa.tional arid inteld:ioH;fi relations which occur with a lexical marker, we cast identity the miHim;d descriptioll of the marker in terms of discourse relations. That is, we can see whether a marker correlates highly with a l)articular discourse relation or combination of informational and intentional relations. Such a study will l)roduce results that are uselqd for coinl)utational models of hoth llatul'al la.ngu~lg(, uzk(lersl.aL~dil~g az~d geHeration. If a certain marker correlates highly with c(~rtai~l discourse relations, the u~dersta, n~der can form hypotheses about the discourse relations that are present whez~ it ellCOUld;ers a marker. Similarly, if a generator must express two utterances connected hy a certain cotubin~a.tion of relations, it can use the information about the correla,tion 1)etween markers and cond)inations of discourse relations to dmose the most appropriate marker.
In addition, this study will allow us to determine whether the distinction among types of dominance plays a, role in accounting tbr the distribution of markers. If the study confirms the relevance of this distinction, then (lomina~,:e types have a role t() play i~ a linguistic theory of discourse coherence. If the study does not ctmtirm the distinction, ;I. ct'ucial theoretical question is whether there is any direct formal linguistic pattern other than these, markers that makes essential use of dominance types in its description. Should fiH'ther research fail to identify such a pattern, then the status of donfinance types in linguistic theory in called in~t(~ question. I[owever, even if it turns out that dominance types are Hot forn~ally m~.rked by la.nguag(~, it remains a.l~ open question whether their application to computer generation an~d tm(lerstan(li~g will b(, useful.
